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COMMENT / Treble Damages-Tax Treatment
and Antitrust Policy*
The tax lawyer is presented with numerous problems as a result of the pro-
visions of the antitrust laws. These problems include the deductibility of legal
fees,' fines and penalties, 2 the tax consequences of divestiture orders,3 and the
tax treatment of treble damages in private actions.
This comment will be limited to tax controversies arising out of private
enforcement of the antitrust laws as provided in Section 4 of the Clayton
Act.4 In turn, this provision for treble damages gives rise to two basic ques-
tions. On the one hand, what would be the tax consequences to the unsuc-
cessful defendant who pays treble damages? On the other hand, what should
be the consequences to the successful plaintiff who recovers treble damages?
The wisdom of the present law will extensively be examined, but before
proceeding to that question, it may be helpful to state the current law.
Stated simply, the amount which the defendant pays is an "ordinary and
necessary" business expense deductible under Section 162 (a) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.5 The amount which the plaintiff receives is includable
in gross income under Section 61.6
Thus, if a defendant is found guilty of price fixing which results in
$100,000 damages to the plaintiff, the defendant will pay a $300,000 judg-
0 Written by Kevin E. Booth, a 1967 graduate from Catholic University of America School
of Law.
1. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
2. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Hoover Motor Express
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United
States, 315 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1963).
3. See Noall & Troxell, Tax Aspects of Antitrust Proceedings, 18 TAx L. REv. 213 (1963).
4. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (a) as interpreted by Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 CUM. BuLL.
52.
6. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 61, formerly § 22, as interpreted by the Court in Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), and later defined by the Service in Treas.
Reg. § 1.61e-14 (a) (1958).
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ment. He will then take a $300,000 tax deduction. Presuming that the de-
fendant is a corporation, it will pay approximately a 50 percent income tax;7
as a result of its price fixing activities, the corporation will be out-of-pocket
$150,000. If the defendant were not a corporation, his tax rate would vary
from 14 percent of the first $500 to a maximum of 70 percent on income over
$100,000, 8 but the effect would be the same.
On the income side, the problem is more complicated. The $300,000 which
the plaintiff received would be includable in gross income. If this money
were taxed at the ordinary corporate rate, the plaintiff would pay $150,000
in taxes. If the plaintiff were not a corporation, he would have a tax rate be-
tween 14 and 70 percent. Due to the defendant's activity however, the plain-
tiff probably lost money over several years, and it seems singularly unjust to
make him pay at an extremely high rate because he recovers many years' lost
profits in one year. Between 1958 and 1964, the plaintiff would have been
allowed to spread his income over as many years as he sustained antitrust in-
juries.9 In 1964, however, the special code provision allowing this treatment
was repealed and Congress substituted the general income-averaging
provision.' 0
One further point remains concerning the tax treatment of the plaintiff.
In the prior discussion it was assumed that his $300,000 recovery was ordi-
nary income. It is possible, however, that the plaintiff might succeed in hav-
ing at least one-third of his recovery taxed at the 25 percent capital gains rate.
The tax treatment of recoveries in civil litigation depends on the nature of
the action upon which the recovery is based." Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co.12 makes it clear that two-thirds of the award will be taxed at the
ordinary rate; plaintiffs have been successful, however, in having the one-
third actual damages taxed as capital gains.'3
This possibility of capital gain should be kept in mind by the lawyer draft-
ing the antitrust complaint. If loss of good will (a capital asset) is empha-
sized, the result may well be a 25 percent tax, rather than the 48 percent rate
which would apply if the emphasis is placed on the lost profits. While it is
suggested that Glenshaw Glass might mean that the additional two-thirds of
the award constitutes ordinary income only when the one-third is ordinary
7. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § I1 for corporate tax rate.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1 (a).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1306, repealed by tit. II, § 232 (a), 78 Stat. 105 (1964).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1301, tit. II, § 232 (a), 78 Stat. 106 (1964).
11. See generally Cutler, Taxation of the Proceeds of Litigation, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 470
(1957); Castigan, Income Taxes on Recoveries for Civil Litigation, U. So. CAL. 1954 TAX INST.
559.
12. Supra note 6.
13. Durkee v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1947); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944).
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income,' 4 subsequent Tax Court decisions indicate that the punitive portion
is always taxable at ordinary rates.15
1. The Deduction Question-Revenue Ruling 64-224
Revenue Ruling 64-22410 has made it clear that a deduction will be allowed
for the amount paid in satisfaction of a treble damages judgment. There has
been considerable controversy about this ruling ever since it was issued. Rep-
resentative Emanuel Celler has publicly stated that:
... to work such a de facto amendment of the antitrust laws by an
administrative ruling, not subject to judicial review, in the teeth
of the clearly expressed intent of Congress, and in face of a long
line of judicial decisions to the contrary, is bad law, bad public
policy, and bad public administration. 7
In a joint press release, Senator Hart and Representative Celler, the chair-
men of the Senate and House Antitrust Subcommittees, respectively, stated
their opinion that ".... the new ruling appears flatly contrary to the existing
law as declared by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. Accord-
ingly, this ruling seems most unfortunate both as a matter of law and from
the viewpoint of tax and antitrust policy."' 8
While the critics of Revenue Ruling 64-224 have been loud and numerous,
the ruling has not been without impressive supporters. On October 5, 1965,
the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association adopted the fol-
lowing resolution on the recommendation of the sections of antitrust law
and taxation: "Resolved, that the American Bar Association approves and
endorses in principle the ruling of the Internal Revenue Service, Ruling
64-224.. "19
The first charge leveled against 64-224 is that it is bad law. What
this means is not entirely clear. There is no doubt, however, that it is the
law, and since the ruling favors the taxpayer, it is unlikely that it will be chal-
lenged in court. Consequently, it will remain the law unless the Service
changes its position or Congress amends either the Internal Revenue Code or
the Clayton Act.
14. Koenig, Federal Taxation of Private Antitrust Recovery, 13 STAN. L. REV. 264, 279
(1961).
15. Ralph Freeman, 33 T.C. 323 (1959); Chalmers Cullins, 24 T.C. 322 (1955); cf. Rev. Rul.
58-418, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 52.
16. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 52.
17. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, STUDY OF INCOME
TAX TREATMENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS 59 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as STAFF STUDY].
18. Id. at 44.
19. Hearings on S. 2479 Before the Subcom. on Antitrust and Monopoloy of the Senate




Apparently, the critics believe that an objective analysis of the judicial
precedents and legislative history should have led the Service to rule against
deductibility. However, an examination of the precedents and legislative
history simply fails either to support or discredit Ruling 64-224.
Profitable examination of the Revenue Ruling may begin by looking to the
.opinion of the tax bar prior to the promulgation of this rule. After an exten-
sive review of the pertinent cases, 20 commentators stated:
Since there is no authority disallowing deductions for payments
made to private litigants, a deduction for the entire amount of the
treble damages, plus reasonable attorneys' fees allowed by section 7
of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act, should be
allowed.
21
Thus, it is to be noted that a year before the Service issued its ruling, tax
lawyers apparently regarded these expenses deductible.
A. Arguments Against the Deduction
The expense of illegal business activities is not deductible.2 2 The test for de-
nial of the deduction is clearly set out in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, where the Court said:
Although each case must turn on its own facts, Jerry Rossman v.
Commissioner (CA2) 175 F.2d 711, 713, the test of nondeductibility
always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from
allowance of the deduction. The flexibility of such a standard is
necessary if we are to accomodate both the congressional intent to tax
only net income, and the presumption against congressional intent to
encourage violation of declared public policy.2 3
Moreover, the legislative history of Section 7 of the Sherman Act, which
preceded Section 4 of the Clayton Act, shows that the section is essentially
penal. At one point in the debate on the original Section 7, a controversy arose
as to whether jurisdiction to enforce the Act should be given to state courts.
Senator Hoar expressed the view of the majority of the Senate that passed the
Act: ". . .but we can not say that a State court shall be clothed with the juris-
diction to enforce a claim for threefold the damages suffered which is purely
penal and punitive."
24
The error of Revenue Ruling 64-224 is demonstrated by the difference be-
tween the flagrant criminal antitrust conspiracy from which it comes25 and
20. Noall & Troxell, supra note 3, at 235-37.
21. Id. at 237.
22. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, supra note 2; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, supra note 2.
23. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 2, at 35.
24. 41 CONe. REc. 9164 (1913).
25. It is presumed that the reader is familiar with the background of Rev. Rul. 64-224,
but perhaps that background should be briefly summarized. The ruling appears to have
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the leading cases allowing the expense deduction. For example, in Jerry
Rossman Corp.26 the offense was inadvertent; there was no criminal convic-
tion; the violator voluntarily disclosed the offense and did his best to make
restitution.
Finally, there is no evidence of a congressional intent to reduce the "sting"
of treble damage payments by allowing a deduction.
B. Arguments in Favor of the Deduction
The deduction should be allowed because actions under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act are remedial in nature. Even though the law gives a plaintiff
enhanced damages, those damages are remedial when they are "recoverable
to his own use and in form and substance the suit calls for indemnity." 27 The
Supreme Court has held a treble damage suit is not a suit for a penalty.
28
Likewise, the double damage provision of Section 16 (b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act has been held remedial rather than penal by the Supreme
Court.
29
Since the overriding purpose of our income tax is to tax net, rather than
gross income, the denial of deductions on policy grounds should be narrowly
construed.3 0 The cases which have denied the deduction seem to fall into six
categories. These are: (1) a fine or penalty paid directly to the state or local
government; (2) expenses to influence legislation; (3) legal fees in connec-
tion with unsuccessful defenses of criminal actions; 31 (4) payments to private
persons when the payment itself is illegal, for example, bribes and kickbacks;
(5) cost of liquor for entertainment in "dry" states; and (6) business enter-
tainment of public officials. Since antitrust treble damage payments to pri-
been issued on the initiative of the Service, but undoubtedly as the result of the Philadelphia
Electric cases. This was a case of "hard core" price fixing. Seven executives went to prison;
23 other officers were given suspended jail sentences and five years probation, and the com-
panies paid $2 million in fines.
As a result, 1,800 civil suits have been brought for treble damages. General Electric, the
largest of the offenders, has already paid $190 million in settlements. Estimates of the
industry-wide settlement figure for civil suits range as high as $400 million. Thus it should
be noted that not only are we talking about a "hard core" criminal conspiracy, but we are
talking about $200 million in lost taxes.
26. Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949). The defendant
corporation had inadvertently charged in excess of OPA ceiling and the payments involved
were voluntary payments made to the Administrator because the parties affected by over-
charges could not be located.
27. Reed v. Northfield, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 94, 101 (1832); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S.
657,668 (1892).
28. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (dictum). The
penal or remedial question arose in the context of deciding whether the state or federal
statute of limitations should be applied.
29. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583 (1942).
30. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 2.
31. Cases denying deductions for this reason have probably been overturned by the recent
Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. Tellier, supra note 1.
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Fate persons do not fall into any of the situations where the deduction has
commonly been disallowed, the Internal Revenue Service was correct in al-
lowing the deduction, and if the result was bad antitrust policy, Congress
should legislatively disallow the deduction.
C. Revenue Ruling 64-224 Was Not Unreasonable
The conclusion is that the Internal Revenue Service, looking at the
precedent and legislative history which existed at the time it issued 64-224,
could either have allowed or disallowed the deduction. Its interpretation was
not unreasonable. This sentiment was expressed by William Orrick, former
head of the Antitrust Division:
The Antitrust Division does not consider metaphysical speculation
on whether 15 U.S.C. § 15 is "penal" or "remedial" to be fruitful;
the Congress which passed the Sherman Act couldn't even decide
that question. Compare the position of Senator Hoar in 21 Cong.
Rec. 3146 (1890) with that of Senator Reagan in 21 Cong. Rec.
3146 (1890).32
Faced with the necessity of deciding the question because of the tremen-
dous treble damage payments growing out of the Philadelphia Electric cases, 33
the Commissioner decided to allow the deduction. Viewed in the context
of the Commissioner's inability to amend the Internal Revenue Code and
his responsibility for its objective interpretation, it is difficult to view Ruling
64-224 as an incorrect application of existing law.
Support for the Commissioner's position is found in a recent article:
.. no matter what one might conclude as a matter of first impres-
sion, it appears too late to argue today that an expense cannot un-
der any circumstances be "ordinary and necessary" in the generally
accepted sense simply for the reason that it is improper in itself or
is incurred in connection with illegal or improper activity. The
clear weight of judicial opinion has not supported this line of
thinking.
34
It must be remembered that the Internal Revenue Service is bound to in-
terpret the Code in a judicial manner, "in a fair and impartial manner, from
neither a government nor a taxpayer point of view." 35
Finally, Commissioner Cohen's opinion that the subsequent Tellier cas0 6
supports Revenue Ruling 64-224 is valid.3 7 It is reasonable to view the unani-
32. STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 105-06. The statement was made in a letter from Mr.
Orrick to Mr. Mortimer M. Caplin, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Sept.
18, 1963.
33. See note 25 supra.
34. Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense, 42 TAXES
808, 817 (1964).
35. REV. PROC. 64-22, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 689.
36. Commissioner v. Tellier, supra note 1.
37. STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 87.
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mous Court in Tellier as giving notice to the Service that the public policy
exception to the general rule of deductibility is a very limited one. 8
D. Antitrust Policy-Congress Should Reverse Revenue Ruling 64-224
Legislation should be enacted reversing Ruling 64-224, not because the Service
was in error or because the rule is bad tax law, but because it fails adequately
to reconcile conflicting policies of tax and antitrust law.
The most serious objection to Congressional reversal of 64-224 is the type
of argument made by the A.B.A. Section on Taxation. "[T]he Section does not
believe it is wise tax policy to attempt to achieve social goals in other areas
by manipulation of tax provisions."3 9 This argument has much to recom-
mend it; perhaps the tax laws should be morally neutral and the tax horizon
should not be clouded by other social policies. There is much in the legisla-
tive history of The 1913 Income Tax Act 40 which supports the A.B.A. position.
During the debates on the bill, an attempt was made to amend the words
"ordinary and necessary" in the deduction section, so that a deduction would
be allowed for "[f]osses incurred by the taxpayer in the pursuit of any ordinary
and legitimate trade or business." 41 This amendment was defeated, the reason
for which was clearly expressed by the bill's sponsor, Sen. John Sharp Wil-
liams:
... the object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say,
what he has at the end of the year [after deductions of his losses]....
It is not to reform men's moral characters; that is not the object at
all.... [You cannot] count the man as having money which he has
not got, because he lost it in a way that you do not approve of.42
The response has been made that we are continually using tax law to im-
plement social policy. Frequently cited examples are percentage depletion
allowances for minerals, 43 the investment credit provision,44 accelerated de-
preciation,45 and capital gain advantages to patent transfers.46 However, it is
seldom pointed out that on most, if not all, of the occasions when Congress
has chosen to implement social policy by means of revenue laws, it has done
so by giving the taxpayer an advantage. Frequently, the taxpayer is re-
warded by paying less than the fair taxes on his income. Congressional re-
38. While the author agrees with those who view Tellier as intended to limit the policy
exception to deductibility, the case may have been viewed from another perspective. Since
the case allowed legal fees in a criminal action, it is at least plausible that it was aimed at
increasing the right to counsel.
39. A.B.A. BULL., SEC. TAx., April 1966, p. 32.
40. The 1913 Income Tax Acts, § II of the Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166.
41. 50 CONG. REc. 3850 (1913).
42. 50 CONG. REC. 3849-50 (1913).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613 (to stimulate exploration for minerals).
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 38 (to stimulate business expansion).
45. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167 (to stimulate increase in depreciable assets).
46. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235 (to stimulate invention).
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versal of Revenue Ruling 64-224 would not reward any taxpayer; rather, it
would be a special provision giving a disadvantage. It is certainly arguable
that the violator of the antitrust laws would be taxed to some extent on his
gross rather than his net income. Although the issue has not been resolved,
there is some authority for the proposition that the term "income," as used
in the sixteenth amendment, means "net income," and not "gross income"
or "gross receipts." 47 This raises the possibility that disallowing the deduc-
tion-whether that result be achieved administratively, judicially, or legisla-
tively-would be unconstitutional.
While the constitutional argument holds some theoretical promise, for sev-
eral reasons it is extremely doubtful that it would succeed. Perhaps the most
important is the reluctance of courts to treat tax questions in constitutional
terms, 48 but frequently there is language in tax cases indicating that deduc-
tions are a matter of "legislative grace." Finally, there is the long history of
judicial denial of deductions on public policy grounds.49
The A.B.A.'s objection to using tax provisions to foster social policy goals,
however, is answered by the fact that courts have been denying deductions on
policy grounds for years. If courts can and do deny deductions on policy
grounds, then Congress can and should enumerate those policies, frustration
of which will result in a denial of deductions. The question is not whether
Congress should use the tax system to achieve social goals in other areas; it is
"whether or not it is possible to achieve that goal more efficiently, directly,
and fairly through other measures which lie outside of the tax system." 50
Here it would appear that an efficient, fair, and direct way to put a "sting"
into the antitrust laws and discourage businessmen from frustrating a na-
tional policy is to deny deductions for the payment of treble damages, at least
in certain circumstances. This presents a major question. If Ruling 64-224 is to
be reversed by Congress, what result should the new legislation achieve? Two
bills have been introduced. On August 30, 1965, Sen. Philip Hart introduced
a bill 51 to amend Section 4 of the Clayton Act. On July 25, 1966, Sen. Russel
Long introduced legislation 52 to amend Section 162 (a) of the Internal Reve-
47. Commissioner v. Weisman, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1952); Hofferbert v. Anderson Olds-
mobile, Inc., 197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952).
48. For example, a similar argument was recently made in the Tax Court in Hagan
Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. No. 13 (Nov. 18, 1966), but the court
brushed aside the constitutional argument and decided on the basis of INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 446 (b).
49. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 2.
50. Remarks by the Honorable Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury be-
fore the Tax Executives Institute, March 7, 1966, cited in Wright, A Tax Formula to Restore
the Historical Effects of the Antitrust Treble Damage Provision, 65 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1966).
51. S. 2479, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
52. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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nue Code. Both bills died in committee, Senator Hart's in the Committee on
the Judiciary and Senator Long's bill in the Committee on Finance.
53
Senator Hart's bill would have amended Section 4 of the Clayton Act by
providing "any judgment entered" and "any payment made by a defendant
in settlement ... shall be treated as a penalty imposed on such defendant by
the United States for such violation."5
4
Senator Long's bill was less sweeping. First, it would have denied a deduc-
tion for only two-thirds punitive damages; in no event would it have taxed
the one-third actual damages. Second, even the two-thirds deduction would
have been disallowed only when the defendant had been subject to a prior
criminal proceeding, as long as there had been a prior criminal proceeding
which established the antitrust violation as "hard core." Here, the two-thirds
disallowance would have applied to either judgment or settlement.
These proposed amendments must be examined in light of the assertion
that allowing the antitrust defendant to pass 50 percent of his treble damage
judgment on to the Treasury is emphasizing tax policy at the expense of
antitrust policy.
Senator Hart's bill said only that the award would be a "penalty." He
would have depended on case law, such as Tank Truck Rentals,5 5 to produce
a deduction exclusion. In the light of the bill's legislative history, it seems
reasonable that the bill would have had the intended effect, but "penalty"
is a word of many legal meanings.5" Reliance on that word to automatically
exclude the deduction is risky business at best. Assistant Attorney General
Donald Turner testified that "[b]ecause of the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in its recent decision in Commissioner v. Tellier, there is an element
of uncertainty as to the precise tax consequences which S. 2479 would
have." 57
Mr. Turner also pointed out that under 15 U.S.C. § 32, a natural person
giving testimony in any antitrust proceeding is immune from prosecution or
penalty concerning any transaction about which he has testified.58 Since
treble damages become a penalty under the Hart bill, the proposed legisla-
tion might have immunized persons who testified in earlier suits from later
53. The reason that two bills, which were to do substantially the same thing, went to
different committees should be explained. Senator Hart's Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly is part of the Judiciary Committee and supervises the antitrust laws. The Finance
Committee, of which Senator Long is Chairman, is responsible for the Internal Revenue
Code.
54. S. 2479, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
55. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
56. Professor Vold has suggested ten shades of meaning. Vold, Constitutionality of Statu-
tory Double or Treble Damages Provisions in Nebraska, 19 NEB. L. REV. 63, 65-66 (1940).
Moreover, penalty used in the sense S. 2479 uses it probably is not its normal meaning; cf.
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
57. Hearings on S. 2479, supra note 19, at 26.
58. Hearings on S. 2479, supra note 19, at 27.
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treble damage actions, possibly leaving the wronged party with no action.
Finally, the extent to which the bill might have been given retroactive effect
is unclear, and it would appear that the bill's purpose might have been frus-
trated by settlement prior to the formal commencement of a treble damage
action.
Senator Long's bill appeared to be the better drafted proposal. One reason
is that it would have amended the Internal Revenue Code, and this is per-
haps the more reasonable approach to the problem. While either proposal
was motivated by a concern for antitrust policy, tax law is the subject in
question, and that is the law which should be amended. No hearings were
held on the Long bill. Perhaps defects in the drafting would come to light if
the bill had been subjected to public hearings. However, at this time, objec-
tions to the proposal would seem to be more a question of the policy deci-
sions which went into its drafting than of technical deficiencies.
While it is not important in which volume of the United States Code the
new legislation appears, it nevertheless seems preferable that the Internal
Revenue Code, rather than the Clayton Act, be amended. In any event, the
legislation should be definite, as was the proposed revenue amendment, and
should not depend on the courts' interpretation of an ambiguous word like
"penalty."
Since the purpose of each bill was to put more "sting" into the antitrust
laws, there should be little relevance to the fact that the defendant might
already have paid taxes on the amount of the actual damages,5 9 for the ques-
tion is not whether the defendant has already paid taxes; it is how large an
additional burden should be imposed on the violator. If the desire is to pro-
duce the maximum deterrent effect, Senator Hart's denial of the entire de-
duction appears more appropriate than Senator Long's denial of two-thirds.
Senator Long's distinction between denial, when there has been prior crim-
inal action, and allowance, when there has not been, is probably sound. An
antitrust offense can occur when the defendant is in good faith. In this situa-
tion, treble damages may be useful in compensating the victim, but there is
no reason to increase the penalty on the offender.60 Since the Antitrust Divi-
sion should bring a criminal action whenever there is a "hard core" offense,
the distinction would apply the increased penalty where it would do the most
good.
Finally, it should be noted that both proposals would have applied to both
59. The probable reason that the one-third, two-thirds distinction was placed in S. 3650
is the feeling that normally the taxpayer would have already paid taxes on the one-third;
thus, if the defendant is guilty of price fixing so that the plaintiff has been injured to the
extent of $100,000, defendant has had $100,000 added income and he has already paid taxes
on it.
60. See Statement of William Simon for the A.B.A., STAFF STUDY, supra note 17, at 35,
40-42.
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settlements and judgments. Increasing the "stakes" for the defendant with-
out a corresponding increase for the plaintiff will make the defendant all the
more willing to delay and less willing to settle. In addition, settlements might
be expected to be lower when the defendant can no longer pass half the cost
to the Government. If the deduction is denied only in "hard core" cases, per-
haps the failure to distinguish between settlements and judgments makes
sense in not allowing the criminal offender to lighten his penalty; but if the
denial is going to apply to all offenses, it is suggested that settlements should
be stimulated by allowing the deduction when the defendant settles a claim
arising out of a noncriminal action.
E. Conclusion
There is nothing sacred about taxation which would leave the area free from
all other policy considerations. Revenue Ruling 64-224 has significantly
blunted the deterrent effect of a major means of enforcing the antitrust pol-
icy, by allowing the defendant to pass one-half of the monetary burden im-
posed for violation of the antitrust law to the Government by way of a deduc-
tion. The present state of the law does not do justice to our national anti-
trust policy. As a result, regardless of whether the Service's decision was cor-
rect or incorrect under existing law, Congress should amend Section 162 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code to deny an "ordinary and necessary" business
expense deduction for "hard core" antitrust violations.
II. The Income Question-Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.e1
One of the unfortunate side effects of Ruling 64-224 is that it has resulted in
considerable interest in the deduction side of the tax-treble damage con-
troversy, while the equally important question of the income side has been
almost totally ignored. 62 Since the Supreme Court's opinion in Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,62 the plaintiff who recovers a treble damage award
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act has income, although the determination
whether that income is ordinary or capital gain appears to depend on the
individual facts. When Glenshaw Glass was decided, its significance was not
lost on the legal community.6 4 However, in 1957 two bills65 were introduced
61. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
62. There appear to be only these recent references to the question of the income status
of treble damage payments. See Wright, supra note 50; the Statement of Professor Wright,
Hearing on S. 2479, supra note 19, at 3-11; question by Senator Hart to Donald Turner,
Hearing on S. 2479, supra note 19, at 35.
63. Supra note 61.
64. 8 ALA. L. REv. 419 (1956); 9 ARK. L. REv, 462 (1955); 22 BROOKLYN L. REv. 154 (1956);
24 FORDHAM L. REV. 469 (1955); 43 GEO. L.J. 691 (1955); 69 HARV. L. REV. 195 (1955); 54
MICH. L. REV. 151 (1955); 21 Mo. L. REV. 187 (1956); 31 NOTRE DAME LAw. 104 (1955); 29
SO. CAL. L. REV. 375 (1956); 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 587 (1955); 25 U. CIN. L. REV. 372 (1956);
1 WAYNE L. REV. 233 (1955).
65. H.R. 494, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) would have exempted private antitrust recoveries
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in the House to reverse Glenshaw Glass. Neither appears to have received
significant support, and Congress contented itself with the various averaging
devices previously noted.66
Two reasons make it imperative that Congress reconsider the income con-
sequences of treble damages while considering the deduction side. First, pri-
vate action for treble damages has been described as "the strongest pillar of
antitrust."67 A primary purpose of enacting the treble damage provision was
to aid the limited resources of the Justice Department in enforcing the anti-
trust laws.68 When the individual victim's incentive to sue is decreased to the
point where he will not bring a suit, the "strongest pillar" has collapsed, and
any interest in putting the sting in antitrust law by reversing Ruling 64-224
would be wasted effort.
Secondly, it appears to have been assumed that the plaintiff has adequate
incentive to sue when success means treble damages. The question is-for the
moment ignoring tax consequences-does any plaintiff ever recover treble
damages? It is doubtful that he will be able to prove satisfactorily the full
extent of his actual damages. Further, the gradual loss of profits over a long
period may have effects on a business that cannot be estimated. There will
be substantial litigation expenses which cannot be recovered. The amount of
time that a plaintiff takes away from his business will never be considered.
"When all of these factors are taken into account, it would be a rare and for-
tunate plaintiff who came out of an antitrust suit with a net recovery amount-
ing to full compensation for his actual damages."6' 9
Thus, if treble damages are the "strongest pillar," and the incentive to
bring these suits has grown less as a result of Glenshaw Glass and high tax
rates, Congress should certainly consider modifying Glenshaw Glass. But the
income question has not only general but also specific relevance at a time
when Congress is considering increasing the stakes for the defendant. If the
defendant is no longer allowed a tax deduction, at least where he settles, he
has more reason to resist private enforcement; plaintiff's job becomes more
difficult and his incentive is correspondingly decreased.
In Glenshaw Glass, the plaintiff had recovered $800,000 from Hartford-
from income. H.R. 4566, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) would have exempted the two-third
punitive portion from income.
66. See text at notes 9, 10 supra.
67. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167,
172 (1958).
68. See Wright, supra note 50, at 247 n. 14. Among others, Professor Wright quotes former
Attorney General Katzenbach as follows:
In addition, a great number of cases make it clear that the primary purpose of Con-
gress in providing a private treble damage remedy was to harness private interest as an
aid to the Government in antitrust law enforcement and thus to further the public in-
terest in deterring antitrust violations
69. Loevinger, supra note 67, at 173.
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Empire. It reported only as much of the award as represented actual dam-
ages. The Tax Court70 and the Third Circuit 7' agreed with the taxpayer that
the punitive portion of the award was not income. The Supreme Court, with
only Justice Douglas dissenting, reversed. Briefly, the Court concluded that
the recovery of actual damages was taxable, a fact which the taxpayer neces-
sarily admitted. The Court reasoned that "[i]t would be an anomaly that
could not be justified in the absence of clear congressional intent to say that
a recovery for actual damages is taxable but not the additional amount ex-
tracted as punishment ....,72
It is important that the Court's opinion in that case be viewed in its proper
perspective. In the Third Circuit, Glenshaw had been consolidated with
Commissioner v. William Goldman Theatres, Inc.73 The common question
was whether money received as exemplary damages for fraud or as punitive
damages for antitrust was includable in gross income. The Court was con-
cerned with whether so-called "windfall" profits were income within the
meaning given to the term in Eisner v. Macomber.74 The Glenshaw decision
was strictly a technical tax decision and no thought appears to have been given
to its possible adverse effects on antitrust policy.
Since there is little doubt that Glenshaw Glass was correctly decided, there
are perhaps only two reasonable paths open for Congressional action. Either
Congress could reverse Glenshaw Glass and make the two-thirds punitive
portion of the award tax free, or they could give capital gains treatment to
two-thirds of the recovery. 75 In either event, the one-third actual damages
should receive no special tax treatment.
Of the two alternatives, the capital gain treatment is more appealing. First,
all money which the plaintiff receives is clearly income to him. It is a rather
serious bending of our revenue system to claim that any income is entirely
tax free. Although there is no way of knowing exactly how much increased
incentive is needed, perhaps 25 percent would be enough, and the proposal
would result in a minimum revenue loss. Preferential capital gain treatment
is an established tax practice, 76 and income lost as a result of extending such
70. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 860 (1952).
71. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928 (3rd Cir. 1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 426
(1955).
72. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Glenshaw was decided
under § 22 (a) of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, but there is absolutely no question that the
same result would be reached under § 61 (a) of the present Code.
73. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra note 71.
74. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1919). The Eisner opinion defines income as " 'gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined ....'"
75. See Wright, supra note 50. Professor Wright would give two-thirds capital gain or
one-third tax free. He would give only one-third tax free because he is attempting to restore
the "historical effect" to antitrust. While his historical effect analysis is interesting, it does
not seem particularly relevant, and to me it makes a lot more sense to give the tax preference
to the entire punitive portion of the recovery, i.e., two-thirds.
76. E.g., see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1235.
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treatment to treble damages should be recouped if defendants are no longer
allowed to take deductions.
Conclusion
There is no question that Glenshaw Glass was correctly decided on technical
tax principles. Yet, if the desire is to make private antitrust enforcement
really effective, the incentive to the plaintiff is at least as important as the
deterrent to the defendant. At a time when Congress is considering increas-
ing the stakes for the defendant by changing the tax consequences on the
deduction side of treble damages, thereby making the plaintiff's job more
difficult and probable settlement offers lower, they should likewise consider
increasing the incentive for the plaintiff.
Effective private enforcement of the antitrust laws demands not only that
offenders be adequately punished, but also that suits be brought against most
offenders. Tax laws should be used to stimulate plaintiffs to bring suits as well
as to deter defendants from antitrust violations. It is argued that this added
stimulation through capital gain treatment of two-thirds of the recovery
should be seriously considered, particularly with regard to plaintiffs who
must commence an action without the help of a prior government suit.
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